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Abstract
One of the important characteristics for intelligent agents is to be able to assess their 
environments in order to generate correct beliefs to make right decisions. It is always 
difficult to do so because many factors including uncertain information, knowledge and 
bounded time will affect intelligent agents to perceive their environments. In this paper, 
we propose a procedure descriptive framework rather than a logical model to describe 
how agents automatically form their beliefs. The process of belief updating in this 
framework remains to be constantly changing, until the point of decision making is 
reached. Using this framework, a subject agent can smoothly fuse its knowledge and 
possible information from the current environment in order to obtain correct beliefs. We 
also present a solution for conflict resolution between agents in this framework. 
Keywords: Intelligent agents, belief, uncertainty   
1. Introduction 
Many mental-level models have been proposed to represent and reason about agents' 
environments (including other agents).  The initial idea of mental-level models came 
from McCarthy [16] and Newell [17]. Rao and Georgeff [19] used three mental 
components: belief, intentions and desires in their paper. Rosenschein and Kaelbing 
[21] developed an interpreter that can implement behavior that is specified using 
notions such as knowledge and goals. Shoham [23] presented an agent oriented 
programming language according to the notions of belief and commitment.  
What the above structures lack is the notion of decision criterion, which embodies the 
agent's approach to action choice under uncertainty [2]. Some attentions have been 
given for this research topic.   Thomason [25] incorporated some type of common-sense 
deliberation about conflicting goals. Rao and Georgeff [18] incorporated expected 
payoff calculations for decision making, and recently Brafman and Tennenholtz 
incorporated qualitative decision criteria [1, 2].
Generally, an intelligent agent describes its beliefs in terms of the knowledge, 
plausibility and time about its environment [7, 5]. In applications, beliefs are not known 
a priori and have to be estimated on-line based on its knowledge and some information 
(such as the message it receives from other potential agents, and the observation it gets 
from its local sensors). The above researchers emphasize more what the beliefs are than 
how the beliefs are formed.
Our motivation in this paper is to develop a procedure descriptive framework rather 
than a logical framework, in which we would like to gain a sound understanding of how 
an intelligent agent can form its beliefs in multi-agent environments. This framework 
will provide an approach for an intelligent agent to support a solution for conflict 
resolution between messages through a global overlooking. To execute the correct 
actions, this framework could also capture many notions of beliefs before and after 
changes in the current environment. The process of belief updating in this framework 
remains to be constantly changing, until the point of decision making is reached. During 
the dynamic change of its belief, the subject agent will incorporate its knowledge about 
other agents (such as trustworthy degrees and similarities of problem solving 
approaches) and the possible uncertain information. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 shows a picture of how an 
intelligent agent evaluates its environment. Section 3 specifies how a subject agent 
forms its belief about the current state.  Section 4 addresses how the beliefs are 
interpreted. In Section 5, we show the difference between our method and traditional 
belief revision. In Section 6 we review related works and compare our framework with 
other research work. Section 7 closes this paper and gives some outlook of our 
contributions.
2. Architecture of Multi-Agent Systems 
The problem-solving process in a multi-agent system begins with the decomposition of 
the system into subsystems, each of which is taken care of by an agent [31].  Each agent 
has its own knowledge base (KB) which contains its beliefs and intentions which 
govern its actions. The subject agent (the agent of interest) perceives the environment 
and receives messages (message1, …, messagen) from other agents.  The subject agent 
then synthesizes the list of messages into its own messages (its current beliefs) and 
generates its desires based on the current beliefs and previously-held intentions 
contained in its KB.  The agent subsequently updates intentions according to its current 
beliefs, and desires, and makes decisions.   
The possible information for a subject agent includes events it observes and messages it 
receives [8]. An agent could observe events about the current world by using its local 
sensors.  In this paper, we use PWA(l) to abstract the event that an agent observes, which 
depends on the local state l appearing in its local sensors. We call PWA(l) the 
observation made by an agent itself, where the observation is driven by the states of the 
possible worlds. In this paper, we assume that the current state does not change during 
one loop of the process of perceiving environments, and thus we do not attach a time 
factor to PWA(l). The observation, however, is generally vague, and the agent hopes to 
rely on other agents' messages about the current state.
The messages come from other agents.  The messages which come from the user are 
called requests in this paper.  After a subject agent sends its user's request to other 
agents, it expects their replies. In most cases, however, the subject agent cannot predict 
when the information will arrive, or indeed insure that every potential agent will send 
back information in reply to its requests. For this situation, the subject agent could use a 
set 4t to describe the agents who have sent back the information at a time point t.  We 
call the set 4t a group of observer agents at time t.  Figure 1 shows the architecture of 
such a multi-agent system. 
Figure 1. The architecture of a multi-agent system 
The subject agent will consider two kinds of factors when it uses its observation and the 
messages provided by the group of observer agents: the uncertainties contained in the 
information, and the conflicts between the observation and messages; where, a message 
(or an agent) is said to be a conflict message (or a conflict agent) if the intersection 
between the massage and the observation is empty.   
The observation and messages usually are subsets of the set of possible worlds, i.e., the 
agents believe that the true world state is in the subset, but they do not know which 
world state it is. For the research in the uncertainty world, people always assume that 
the true world state absolutely belongs to the observation, so they usually cast away all 
of the conflict agents' contributions.  
In the agent world, however, the observation is just a local observation. Figure 1(a) 
shows a possible example for the case of the agent world. In this example, the subject 
agent receives 8 messages from 8 observer agents in order to decide which state in its 
observation is mostly like the true state. If the subject agent discards all of the conflict 
messages (see Figure 1(b)), the subject agent will believe that the true state is likely at 
the left side of the observation. On the other hand, because there are many messages 
occur at the right side of the observation, if the subject agent could overlook the global 
picture, it would have a belief that the true state would be at the right side of the 
observation.
ObserverAgent1 ObserverAgentn
message1 messagen
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SubjectAgent
protected:
list<Message*>message;
Message synthesize();
Action decision(); 
…
Figure1. An Example for Conflicts 
In this paper, the subject agent will not cast away all of the conflicts, and we expect it to 
have the ability of overlooking the global picture. It is difficult to do so, because the 
conflict messages cannot be described by local knowledge. Instead of describing the 
conflict messages, in this paper we re-evaluate agents by transferring trustworthy 
degrees from conflict agents to some related non-conflict agents. We use an interval 
structure (one kind of Pawlak rough set on two distinct but related universes [28]) to 
describe the uncertainties contained in the information.  To solve the conflicts, we use 
trustworthy degrees to describe how the subject agent trusts other agents' messages, and 
an equivalence relation to characterize the dependencies among other agents. The 
equivalence relation reveals the fact that agents with similarities of problem solving 
approaches or performance are related, and must be put into the same equivalence class. 
More formally, we use a finite set W to illustrate the possible worlds (states), and a 
finite set 4 to represent other potential agents. A prior probability distribution PrA on 4
is used to characterize trustworthy degrees of the other agents. The agents can be 
classified into some equivalence classes according to their performance or abilities of 
problem solving. The agents in the same equivalence class have similar problem solving 
approaches or similar performance (e.g., precisions are similar). The equivalence class 
of an agent T could be defined as follows: 
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Based on the above assumptions, the subject agent's belief about the possible 
information and the knowledge of the group of observer agents at time t will be 
represented by a pair (see Section 3 for details): 
!  tA
t
At BPrBIK ,
in which
x tAPr is a posterior probability on 4t,  which could be induced  by transfer 
prior probability PrA from some cooperating conflict agents to its 
neighbours, where an agent is said to be a neighbour of a conflict agent if 
they both belong to a same equivalence class, and their messages are joined. 
x Multi-set valued mapping tAB  from  2
W to 24t is an interval structure, which 
synthesizes all of the possible information at time t,  and
x 4t4  is the group of observer agents at time t.
The messages 
The conflict messages 
(a) (b)
The belief is changeable with the passage of time, up until the point of decision making. 
At this time, the subject agent gives a numerical function mt from 2W to [0,1],  which 
satisfies  
))(()( SBPrSm tA
t
At  
by combining tAPr and
t
AB . This numerical function is a Dempster-Shafer mass function 
[22] (see Section 4 for details).
The subject agent can also use this uncertain measure to estimate expected utilities and 
select the suitable action whose expected utility is maximum (the appropriate decision 
approaches can be found in [15]).
3. Modelling Agent Beliefs 
In this section, we firstly present an approach for information synthesizing, then we 
introduce a method to evaluate the posterior probabilities. 
3.1 Information Synthesizing 
An agent in mental level states is described as a state machine [3, 2], a triplet A = <LA,
AA, PA>, which has a set of possible (local) states, LA, a set of possible actions, AA, and a 
map PA: LA o AA. The agent's observation at l  LA, PWA(l), is defined as
{wW  | the agent's local state l in w is True } 
while agent's local state is l. PWA(l)  is a set of possible worlds, which is consistent with 
the agent's information of local states. This definition is used to describe knowledge to 
an agent at a local state [8, 20].  
The observation shows there are some worlds that are consistent with an agent’s local 
state l. The problem, however, is that the agent does not know which world is the 
current world w0  PWA(l).  So the agent hopes to get a solution by using other agents' 
messages. 
Because each observer agent can provide a message at time t to show the related worlds, 
we can use a multi-set valued mapping *A to describe the relationship between observer 
agents and the possible worlds: 
¯
®
­

4
 *
o4*
otherwise,
if,message
)(
such that,2:
t
A
W
A
T
T T
In order to show which observer agents support a given set of worlds, we now consider 
an extended map tAB of *A, which satisfies: 
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At BPrBIK , is called the belief of agent A at time t, where, 
t
APr is a 
posterior probability distribution over 4t (in the next subsection we will see how to 
induce it); and tAB is an extended map of *A.
We can prove that tAPr is an interval structure [14]. For a given set of worlds, S,
t
AB  (S)
contains all observer agents at time t, whose messages do not completely conflict with 
agent A's observation, and the intersections of the messages and the observation are 
equal to S.
We call tAB the belief about uncertain information at time t. We call a set X of worlds a 
focal element of tAB  if 
t
AB  (X)  . The set of all focal elements of 
t
AB is called the 
granule collection at time t, indicated as tBG . We call 
t
APr the knowledge about observer 
agents at time t.
3.2 Belief Transferring 
As mentioned in Section 2, a prior probability distribution PrA on 4 could be used to 
characterize the subject agent's trustworthy degrees towards other agents. This can be 
learned in an on-line setting based on long term observations (notice: the agents in a 
same equivalence class may have the different trustworthiness, because some agents 
may refuse to cooperate). However, we will not discuss the on-line setting here.  
Considering there may be some dependencies between agents, we can transfer the prior 
probability from some conflict agents to other agents to obtain the posterior probability. 
Let agent Ti and agent Tj both belong to an equivalence class jCT , and they both provide 
messages to the subject agent at time t. We assume Tj is a conflict agent, and the 
intersection between Tj 's message and Ti 's message is not empty. At this situation, we 
can imagine that Tj will partially support Ti 's result.
For a given conflict agent Tj, the following is the evaluation process for the posterior 
probability: 
(1) Normalize PrA on 4t;
(1) Find the equivalence class,
j
CT , in 4t for the conflict agent; 
(2) Determine the neighbours in
j
CT , whose messages overlap with Tj’s message, 
denoted as
j
NT ;
(3) Calculate the posterior probability tAPr by transferring Tj 's probability to 
each agent T’ of
j
NT :
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A graphical interpretation of this process is depicted in Figure 2. In Figure 2(a) each 
agent is represented by a circle with its prior probability. The agents that are shaded 
belong to the group of observer agents, 4t, where T6 is a conflict agent. There are 3 
equivalence classes that are surrounded in three curved surfaces. Figure 2(b) shows the 
process of transferring the probabilities from the conflict agents (e.g., T6) to its 
neighbour (e.g., T2).
Figure 2. The process of transferring 
4. The Interpretations of Beliefs 
In this section we first explain the probabilities over 4 and 4t, then interpret the belief 
about uncertain information at time t.
We assume that there is a prior probability distribution PrA over 4. Given a sentence y,
by using the technique called Logical Imaging [24], we can derive a new probability 
distribution Pr’A over 4t from the prior probability distribution PrA:
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This Logical Imaging [13] implies a restrictive assumption that is related to the 
“uniqueness” problem.  That is, a given agent is only most similar to one of other 
agents. In 1988, a generalization of Logical Imaging was proposed [6]. The 
generalization can overcome the “uniqueness” problem.  Using the generalization, we 
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can derive a new probability distribution ''TPr  over 4t from the prior probability 
distribution PrA:
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TPr (T’) is a probability function to represent the degree that agent T supports agent T’,
and NT is all the agents to which T are most similar while y is true.  
Let y be the imagination (the belief transferring commitment) that we used in section 
3.2, )'(Pr1)'( TTT AA K
Pr  , and NT be the neighbours of T. It is not very difficult to prove 
that the posterior probability defined by equation (2) is one kind of the generalization of 
Logical Imaging.
As mentioned before a subject agent's belief is constantly updating and ceases to update 
at a time point t of decision making.  In order to make a decision, at the time point t, the 
subject agent can derive a numerical function mt:  2W o [0,1] based on its belief 
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It is not difficult to prove that mt is a Dempster-Shafer mass function [22]. This result 
only tells us that the subject agent can synthesize all of the information into a numerical 
function based on its belief at time t.
5.  Analysis of Belief Revision 
In order to test what is the difference between our theory and the traditional belief 
revision, we now assume that the messages provided by the group of observer agents 
are captured by a random set (PrA, *A), where PrA is the prior probability on 4,  and *A
is the multi-set valued mapping that describes the relationship between observer agents 
and the possible worlds: 
This random set can derive a Dempster-Shafer mass function [12] at time t, which 
satisfies  
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The observation that the subject agent makes is PWA(l), a subset of W. For the above 
mass function m and the observation PWA(l),  the Dempster rule of conditioning can be 
used to synthesize them. The following is the synthesis formula: 
°
°
¯
°°
®
­
z
 
o
¦
¦
 
 
otherwise,0
if,
)(1
)(
)(
such that],1,0[2:
)(
)( S
Xm
Xm
Sm
m
lPWX
SlPWX
A
W
A
A
A
In above equation the function mA is still a Dempster-Shafer mass function.  
We can also have the following according to the above definition: 
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To compare this formula and the formula in equation (3), we can obtain the following 
conclusions:
x In the traditional uncertainty processing, the subject agent will discard all of the 
conflict agents; and it makes decision only based on its prior probability about 
observer agents; 
x In our framework, the subject agent will consider some conflict agents’ 
opinions; and it makes decisions according to the posterior probability about 
observer agents. 
x Our framework is the generalization of the traditional approach. 
6. Related Work 
The principle implied in our framework is the approach of synthesizing all of 
information at a time point. This kind of research is related to two topics: how to model 
the process of belief change and how to synthesize the possible information. 
In the process of uncertainty management, Khan and Jain believed that the outputs are 
based on not only the mean value of corresponding inputs but also the uniformity about 
corresponding inputs [10]. A synthesis strategy for heterogeneous distributed expert 
systems was developed by C. Zhang et al [29, 30]. Another approach is the draft idea 
for using granular objects, which is based on a calculation of support from each of the 
source for a proposed fused value [27]. 
What the above approaches lack is the concept of belief updating.  Our framework in 
this paper implies a dynamic strategy for information synthesis under uncertainties.  In 
this dynamic strategy, a probability is used to describe the factors of authorities from 
other agents, and the influence among agents is completed by the Logical Imaging
technique.  
In our framework, the synthesis result at time t is a mass function. This result is quite 
different from the conditions made by Kreps [11] and Brafman and Tennenholtz [1, 2] 
in their decision models. Kreps assumed that the agent can use a numerical probability 
to model its belief. In opposite, Brafman and Tennenholtz used the complete ignorance 
condition to describe the current state. 
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and artificial 
intelligence [6].  The standard frameworks for beliefs can be given by means of Kripke
structures used in modal logics of knowledge and belief [9]. A Kripke structure for 
belief is a tuple ( W, S, K1, …, Kn), where W is a set of  possible worlds,  S(w) is a truth 
assignment to the primitive proposition at world wW, and the Kis are accessibility 
relations on the worlds in W.  If we define Ki(w)={w' | (w, w')  Ki }, then Ki(w)
describes the set of worlds that agenti considers possible in w.  In this modal logical 
framework, the knowledge (also including common knowledge, and distributed 
knowledge) encoded by the standard Kripke structures is discussed.  This modal logical 
framework has also been extended by Friedman and Halpern [5], in which they discuss 
knowledge, plausibility (a plausibility measure [4] to each agent at each world), and 
time.  
In applications, it is always difficult for an agent to recognize the exact knowledge as 
described within the Kripke structures. Also it does not consider how to modelling 
conflict messages.  
7. Summary 
In this paper we have formalized a framework for intelligent agents to perceive their 
environments.  In this framework, the descriptions about belief and belief updating are 
given by the procedure descriptive approach rather than the logical model.  The 
contributions of this research include: 
(1) A dynamic strategy to model agents' knowledge about a group of observer 
agents is proposed in our framework.  In this dynamic strategy, a probability 
is used to describe the factors of trustworthy degrees from agents, and the 
dependencies among agents are described by the technique of Logical
Imaging.
(2) A new method for conflict resolution between agents in multi-agent 
environments is presented in this framework.  
(3) The belief revision in this framework is the generalization of traditional ones. 
We will use this framework to discuss agent-based software engineering in the future.   
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